· Soviet idea of coexistence was to prevent military conflict, which was seen as a viable choice. But for Chinese, coexistence underlines global interaction, trade

　　· Neither China nor US has the moral authority to force other countries to sacrifice their pursuit of growth and development to accept a bifurcated world economy

　　To access the original article, please click on the link: The South China Morning Post

　　The meeting between presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Bali G20 summit indicates a commitment to prevent the US-China relationship from spiralling downwards. Observers are right to see the challenges ahead as structural. But is "coexistence 2.0" a useful framing to adopt?

　　After World War II, "peaceful coexistence" was commonly seen as Soviet phraseology for framing its relations with the West: keep open channels of communication with the United States and western Europe to avoid military conflict. Conflict was viewed as a viable choice.

　　In contrast, the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa, China included, endorsed the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" – where the corresponding Chinese expression is  gongchu. Gongchu  is more about operating and interacting with other countries than about goals. Accordingly, the coexistence of countries is an accepted fact.

　　Since World War II, the US and its allies have consistently adopted the notion of an "international order" in conceiving foreign relations. Does reference to "coexistence", in academic discussions, to US-China relations today imply seeing military conflict as a viable option?

　　Today and into the future, the US remains unrivalled. This is manifested in its military power, dynamism in technological and business innovation, share of the world economy, capacity to garner a following for its foreign policy initiatives, etc. The structural difficulty the US faces, as a country, primarily lies in domestic income redistribution.

　　Throughout modern history, China has benefited enormously from inputs from the US. Examples include market opportunities, education, science and technology and, yes, ideas for reforming civil administration. China also faces challenges in domestic income redistribution.

　　Unlike the US, which is largely self-sufficient in energy and other essential inputs, China has to cultivate overseas markets for natural resources and for its products. For China, this interdependence is natural and structural.

　　Chinese initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative, are focused on development measured only in economic and technological terms – and are not meant to build political/security alliances. The main thrust of China's Global Security Initiative continues to be the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

　　Those initiatives have to generate buy-in, especially in other middle- and low-income countries facing a range of choices. There is hardly a basis for China to contemplate Cold War 2.0 as a modality of its relations, whether with the US or the rest of the world.

　　In the US, it seems, China has become a valence issue rather than a divisive one between the Democratic and Republican parties. Between Chinese and American observers, an agreed genealogy of the past is difficult to construct. The past six years of minimal contact between the functional agencies of the two governments have to be a cause of serious concern.

　　The longer the stalemate, the more difficult it will be for productive interactions, even when agreement is reached at the head-of-state level to restore normalcy. The utility of presidential summits should be viewed with this challenge in mind.  

　　As I see it, the anxieties among foreign policy elites of both the US and China about each other do not stem from each society having too much impact on the other. Quite to the contrary, the flow of Chinese investment into the US is traditionally low. For example, according to the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, investment last year from Singapore was about three times that from China.

　　Even so, the situation is not conducive to shaping views about China that are different from those projected to American voters. Instead, there is sustained talk about a confrontation to come.

　　As such, China should find the fortitude to promote greenfield investments – as opposed to an emphasis on financial ones – in America's society and economy. 

　　The US should resist defining such projects as undesired influences. After all, investments from all countries are subject to the same US regulatory controls. Jobs created and income generated are as American as can be, along with benefits to American workers and their families.

　　I am not saying an increase in Chinese investment in the US can be the key to countering the punitive sentiments about China in American politics. According to news reports, in the midterm elections, in one-fifth of the battleground districts, China featured prominently as a campaign issue.

　　Still, it is hard to pinpoint China as a decisive factor in voter behaviour. In any case, to stabilise long-term bilateral relations, China should beware of missing the wood for the trees.

　　Whatever the framing of ties between China and the US, they have to factor in the wishes of other countries. Indeed, national resilience in global supply chains is a common pursuit. What the US calls "invest, align and compete" is what the Chinese term as "dual circulation".

　　For both China and the US, it is advisable to note how Southeast Asian nations talk about non-alignment.

　　Neither China nor the US has the moral authority to force other countries to sacrifice their pursuit of growth and development to accept a bifurcated world economy.

　　In the final analysis, the framing of "coexistence 2.0" is the wrong Cold War lesson to draw in thinking about how China and the US should conceive their relationship in a changing world.

　　Zha Daojiong is a professor in the School of International Studies and the Institute of South-South Cooperation and Development, Peking University. This is an edited version of his prepared remarks at the “Coexistence 2.0: US-China Relations in a Changing World” conference, held by the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University.